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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
Jurisdiction prior to transfer from the Utah Supreme Court was proper pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court erroneously award a measure of damages other than the cost 
or reasonable value of services on the plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: 
The measure of damages recoverable under the plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim was 
argued to the district court at trial prior to the court's ruling. (R.628-30). The district court's 
determination regarding the applicable measure of damages is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness by this court. Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc.. 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App. 
1992). 
2. Applying the correct measure of damages, did the plaintiff fail to adduce sufficient 
evidence regarding certain services allegedly performed? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: 
The insufficiency of evidence adduced by the plaintiff on portions of the damages claimed 
was argued to the district court at trial prior to the court's ruling. (R.630-36). Because of its 
disposition of the damages issue, the district court did not make any factual findings regarding 
the sufficiency of evidence of the services provided to defendant. Sufficiency of evidence to 
1 
sustain an award of damages is a question of law reviewed de novo by this Court. Meese V. 
Brigham Young University. 639 P.2d 722 (Utah 1981). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 1002. 
To prove the content of writing, recording, or photograph, the 
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as 
otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of this State or by Statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim for unjust enrichment brought against defendant Robert Alder, 
the plaintiffs former son-in-law, in connection with the construction of a house. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Groscost filed an action against defendant Robert Alder setting forth causes of action for 
breach of contract, open book account,1 and unjust enrichment. (R.60). Alder answered the 
complaint and asserted a counterclaim, alleging that Groscost had improperly filed a lien on the 
property. (R.15). 
The matter was tried to the Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup November 9-10, 1994, and December 
13, 1994. The court found that there was no meeting of the minds between Groscost and Alder, 
and therefore no contract existed. (R.147). 
Groscost did not pursue the open account cause of action at trial. 
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The court found that Groscost was entitled to recover under his claim of unjust 
enrichment. (R. 147-48, 648). The court stated that "[t]he measure of damages under that claim 
is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendants. That's the Defendant's gain, and not the 
detriment of the plaintiff or not what the value the Plaintiffs services were." (R.648). As a 
consequence, the court awarded Groscost all profits derived by Robert Alder from the sale of 
the house, calculated by the sale price less Alder's personal contribution to the house. (R.148-
49). 
The district court also found that Groscost had filed an invalid mechanic's lien for an 
improper purpose, and awarded Alder reasonable attorney fees incurred in obtaining release of 
the lien. (R. 149-50). Groscost did not appeal the court's ruling on this issue. 
In this appeal, Alder does not challenge the district court's factual findings. Alder 
contends, however, that the trial court applied an improper measure of damages. Alder further 
contends that under the correct measure, all or substantial portions of Groscost's damages claim 
is unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial. 
Factual Background 
At the time of the events in question, plaintiff James Groscost was the father-in-law of 
defendant Robert Alder. (R.206). In approximately November 1991, the parties first began 
discussing the possibility of Alder and his wife, Janalyn Alder (Groscost's daughter) building 
a house. (R.644). Work on the project itself began in approximately June 1992. (R.384). 
Both parties contended that they had entered into an agreement regarding construction 
of the house, agreeing that the Alders were supposed to pay for "costs" incurred in building the 
house. (R.220, 555-56, 593). The parties differed, however, as to the items to be included in 
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such costs. (E.g., R.558-59). The district court ultimately concluded that there had been no 
meeting of minds, and that no binding contract existed regarding the project. (R.147). 
Construction of the house progressed over several months. In January 1993, Groscost 
submitted an interim statement of costs in order to draw on a construction loan the Alders had 
procured, (T.245, 248). 
In late May, 1993, Janalyn Alder announced to Robert Alder that she wanted a divorce. 
(R.566). Alder wanted the marriage to continue, but Janalyn was unwilling. (R.399). 
Remaining work was done on the house, which was substantially completed by June 4, 
1993, the date upon which the mortgage on the house closed. (R. 149). At the June 4 closing, 
Groscost2 submitted a statement to the mortgage lender stating that the total expenses incurred 
by Broken Arrow on the project as of June 2 were approximately $107,000. With the sums 
received upon closing and from the previous construction loan draw, less certain reductions, 
Groscost received $149,931.20 in payment from the Alders. (R.259-60). 
The house was sold to a third party in August 1993 at a price of $295,000. (R.148). 
At closing upon the sale in August, Groscost (through Janalyn) submitted a written 
demand to Alder to pay approximately $37,000, which he claimed were unreimbursed costs. 
(R.382-86). Groscost admitted, however, that approximately $23,000 of those "costs" were 
sums which the Alders had not originally been expected to pay because it was a family matter. 
(R.375-81, 386). Groscost testified that his attitude had changed when the Alders' marriage 
broke up, turning the arrangement into a "business matter." (R.333-34). 
2
 Various aspects of the services claimed were provided by Broken Arrow, a construction company 
owned by Groscost and his brother-in-law. For convenience, references in this Brief to the providers of 
the services claimed will be to Groscost. The district court concluded that Groscost was entitled to 
recover for Broken Arrow's services. (R.647). 
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Alder did not agree to pay the demand, and in September 1993 Groscost filed a lien on 
the property in approximately the same amount. (R.350). Groscost testified that at the time he 
filed the lien, all of the information regarding costs of the house was readily available to him. 
(R.422). In January 1994, Groscost filed the present action, stating that Alder owed him 
$37,610.00 as the reasonable value of services provided (R.3); the complaint was later amended 
to seek $51,822.80. (R.61). Groscost's complaint sought recovery only of "the reasonable 
value of the materials provided." (R.64). 
In the complaint, Groscost sought joint and several liability of Robert Alder for the entire 
amount claimed. (R.62). Although Janalyn Alder was named as a defendant, Groscost never 
served her. Robert Alder subsequently cross-claimed against Janalyn for one-half of the amount, 
if any, recovered against him by Groscost. (R.25). Groscost ultimately agreed to amend his 
initial claim that Robert Alder was jointly and severally liable for the entire amount, and 
stipulated that Alder would be liable only for one-half of the amount allegedly owing. (R. 131). 
The case proceeded to trial on November 9, 1994. (The trial proceeded for portions of 
November 9-10, and continued on December 13, 1994.) At the conclusion of trial, the district 
court found that no meeting of the minds had occurred between the parties to the alleged 
contract, and therefore no contract existed. (R.147). The court then concluded that Groscost 
was entitled to recover on his claim for unjust enrichment. The court found that Groscost had 
conferred a substantial benefit upon defendants, that defendants acknowledged and recognized 
the benefit, that defendants had at all times "intended to pay for the House," and that "it would 
be unjust to allow defendants to retain the benefit conferred by plaintiff without paying for it." 
(R. 147-48, 648). 
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In determining an amount to be awarded Groscost, the district court rejected Alder's 
contention that the measure of damages was the reasonable value of services provided. The 
Court's ruling also went beyond the relief south in Groscost's complaint for "the reasonable 
value of the materials provided," and Groscost's indication at trial that he was seeking only that 
measure of recovery. (R.608-09). 
In explaining his ruling, the district court stated that the benefit conferred upon 
defendants was not the services provided, but the defendant's "gain." (R.648). The court then 
awarded Groscost all profits received by Robert Alder upon the sale of the home, calculated as 
the proceeds received from the sale reduced by the amount of Alder's personal contribution. 
Groscost was awarded $27,415.00 under his unjust enrichment claim. (R.151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is difficult to determine whether the district court based its finding of unjust enrichment 
upon a theory of contract implied in fact or of contract implied in law. Groscost's complaint 
asserted only a cause of action for contract implied in fact, but the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law appear to combine elements of both types. In this case, however, the court 
applied an erroneous measure of damages in either event. 
If the district court's finding of unjust enrichment was based upon a contract implied in 
fact, the court failed to recognize that the applicable measure of damages is the amount intended 
by the parties. In this case, both parties testified that the Alders intended to pay the costs of 
construction. Even if the court were unable to determine the agreed-upon price, under that 
circumstance the amount to be paid is presumed to be the reasonable value of the services 
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provided. There is no legal basis for awarding Groscost a different measure of damages in this 
case. 
If the district court's decision was based upon a contract implied in law, longstanding 
precedent of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court establishes that the correct measure of 
damages is reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon defendant, namely the services 
received. 
Under either explanation, the approach taken by the district court was contrary to Utah 
law. Additionally, it is illogical from a practical standpoint. Under the district court's theory, 
a plaintiff would be deprived of any recovery for services provided if the defendant failed to net 
any gain from them. A party's entitlement to recovery for unjust enrichment would thus hinge 
upon arbitrary and unpredictable factors. 
The district court did not make any factual findings necessary to apply the correct 
measure of damages. However, as a matter of law Groscost failed to adduce sufficient evidence 
on certain aspects of his damages claim. With respect to certain specified items, Groscost failed 
to adduce any evidence of cost or reasonable value. On other items, Groscost testified that the 
only way to determine their applicability to the Alder house (instead of other projects identified 
on Groscost's own documentation) was by review of a specific record which Groscost did not 
offer at trial. On a few additional items claimed, Groscost failed to offer evidence linking the 
items to the Alder house. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
GROSCOST THE PROFITS ALDER REALIZED IN 
SELLING THE HOUSE RATHER THAN THE 
REASONABLE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT 
CONFERRED. 
The principle underlying recovery in unjust enrichment cases is simple: "A person who 
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." 
Restatement of Restitution § 1. The ordinary meaning of restitution is to return or restore 
something to its owner. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. In this case, however, 
the district court went beyond the ordinary understanding of restitution and awarded Groscost 
all profits on the house. 
As noted above, the basis for this ruling was the district court's belief that damages in 
an unjust enrichment claim are measured by a defendant's "gain"; in other words, that the 
benefit conferred for purposes of calculating damages is the amount of a defendant's profit, not 
the services or money received. 
In ruling that Groscost was entitled to recover under his claim for unjust enrichment, the 
district court did not indicate whether the ruling was based upon contract implied in fact or 
contract implied in law. See Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). Groscost 
alleged the elements of contract implied in fact in his complaint: 
Defendants requested that plaintiff furnish materials in the construction of 
the house. 
Plaintiff furnished the materials requested by defendants in the 
construction of the house. 
In furnishing the materials, plaintiff did not act as a volunteer or 
intermeddler and expected to be reimbursed for the cost of such materials. 
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Defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff expected to be 
reimbursed for the costs of such materials and also knew or should have known 
that plaintiffs performance would confer a benefit upon them. 
(R.63-64, paras. 24-27); see Davies. supra. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law appear to incorporate elements of both types 
of quantum meruit. (E.g., findings that Groscost conferred a benefit, that Alders intended to 
pay for the house, etc.; R. 148-49). If the basis for the court's ruling was contract implied in 
fact, the measure of damages applied was plainly erroneous: "Technically, recovery in contract 
implied in fact is the amount the parties intended as the contract price. If that amount is 
unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties intended the amount to be the reasonable market 
value of the plaintiffs services." Id., citation omitted. 
As mentioned previously, Groscost testified that the Alders were expected to pay "the 
costs of the house." Robert Alder also testified to that effect, although his understanding 
differed as to whether certain types of costs would be expected to be reimbursed. Under both 
parties' testimony, therefore, the intended price was to be measured by the cost of the house. 
Moreover, if the court were unable to determine the intended payment price,it would be inferred 
to be reasonable value. Accordingly, it was inappropriate for the district court to apply a 
different standard. 
If the district court's ruling of unjust enrichment was based upon contract implied in law, 
again the measure of damages employed was contrary to Utah law. The Supreme Court long 
ago addressed — and rejected — the contention that recovery is measured by a defendant's 
"gain." In Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Company. 41 Utah 404, 125 P. 860, 862 (1912), the 
plaintiff rendered services in advertising, introducing, and selling the defendant's products. The 
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initial understanding between the parties fell within the statute of frauds, and no enforceable 
contract existed. The lower court awarded the plaintiff the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. 
On appeal, the defendant Massert[ed] that under the facts found by the court the 'benefits' 
received by the defendant cannot be measured by ascertaining and determining the reasonable 
value of the services rendered by plaintiff, and accepted and received by the defendant, but by 
ascertaining and determining whether the services resulted to the defendant's profit or gain, 
whether it 'was enriched' thereby, and, if so, 'what was the value of that enrichment?'" 125 
P. at 861. 
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument in favor of the "well-established 
rule" that, where a party renders and the defendant knowingly accepts services, the plaintiff 
"may recover on a quantum meruit the reasonable value thereof — not the profit or gain resulting 
to the adversary party by reason of the transaction, nor the loss suffered or sustained by the 
other, but compensation for the reasonable value of the services rendered by the one and 
accepted and received by the other." Id.3 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that rule 35 years later in Baugh v. Parley. 112 Utah 1, 
184 P.2d 335 (1947). In that case, the court recognized that "[w]hen a contract for personal 
services is not enforceable or is void under the statute of frauds because not performable within 
3
 The Supreme Court has rejected other attempts to modify damages in an unjust enrichment case 
to allow recovery of a defendant's profits or reduction for a defendant's loss. See, e.g., Harline v. 
Daines. 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977) (benefit conferred was amount paid by plaintiff; no reduction for 
losses on project; award also did not include ultimate profit); McCarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 
P.2d 732 (1964) (award of reasonable value of work done "was simply what justice required"; no 
reduction for defendant's alleged losses on project); Foul per v. McGrath. 34 Utah 86, 95 P. 1004 (1908) 
(action for construction work not based upon contract; claim by contractor for profits received by 
defendant in excess of reasonable value of plaintiffs work rejected.) 
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a year, the courts will generally permit the plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of services 
rendered by him, in pursuance of the oral agreement." Id., 184 P.2d at 337 (emphasis added). 
The Baugh court concluded that the elements of unjust enrichment were not met in that 
case, but added that it would have been bound to reverse on the question of damages even if a 
claim had been stated, observing: "[I]n an action for unjust enrichment . . . the measure of 
damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value of the services rendered." 
Id., 184 P.2d at 339. 
The court cited Baugh approvingly in Fowler v. Taylor. 554 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah 1976), 
in which the court addressed a claim for unjust enrichment under a theory of "implied in law 
or quasi contract," having previously concurred that no contract implied in fact existed. In its 
analysis of the quasi-contract claim, the court reiterated: "It should be observed that in an action 
for unjust enrichment, the measure of damages is the reasonable value of what plaintiff has 
done." Id., citing Baugh. supra. 
This general rule has been consistently expressed in Supreme Court opinions involving 
implied-in-law or quasi contracts. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Wareing. 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 
341, 343 (1951); Rapp v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Company. 606 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Utah 
1980) ("where work is ordered for the benefit of a building owner, . . . such work must, in 
equity, be recompensed to avoid unjust enrichment. Defendant having received the benefit of 
plaintiffs work in the present case, recovery of the reasonable value thereof is warranted"); 
General Leasing Co. v. Manivest Corp.. 667 P.2d 596, 598 (Utah 1983) (recognizing 
"reasonable value" measure); J & M Construction. Inc. v. Southam. 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986) 
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(award of amount billed for construction services as value of benefit conferred under unjust 
enrichment theory affirmed).4 
However, some ambiguity in the standard may have resulted from this Court's decision 
in Davies, supra. In that case, the Court endeavored to provide guidance regarding the two 
branches of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, and the proper measure of damages under 
each. With respect to contract implied in law, the Court first explained: 
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, is 
one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but 
rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19, 
at 44, 46 (1963). The elements of a quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, 
are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for 
the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it. See Berrett v. Stevens, 
690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust enrichment"). 
Id. at 269. 
The Court then observed: "The measure of recovery under quasi-contract, or contract 
implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant and not the detriment 
incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980), or 
necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services." Id. 
There is no indication that the Davies court intended to reject prior Supreme Court 
precedent as to the measure of damages in quasi-contract unjust enrichment cases. The court 
simply clarified the existing law, which was (and is) that the measure of damages for contract 
implied-in-law is the reasonable value of services conferred. (By contrast, the measure of 
4
 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court either characterized the claim as based upon contract 
implied in law, or made it clear through recitation of the elements of quasi-contract. 
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damages for contract implied in fact is the price intended by the parties. If the intended contract 
price cannot be determined, it is then inferred to be the reasonable market value of the services.) 
Unfortunately, the wording of the Davies opinion appears to be ambiguous in part, as 
evidenced by differing constructions subsequently given the language by this Court itself. In 
order to provide support for the district court's view of damages, the language "or necessarily 
the reasonable value of services" must be qualified by the preceding word "not." In other 
words, Davies must be read to say the measure of recovery is "not . . . necessarily the 
reasonable value of services," rather than as saying "the measure of recovery under quasi-
contract, or contract implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant . . 
., or necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services." 
The error of such a reading is manifest in two clear ways. First, it is not reasonable to 
read Davies in a manner which rejects a long line of Supreme Court decisions applying the 
reasonable value standard in implied-in-law cases. Even if this Court had intended to define a 
new standard, it seems unlikely that such a significant change would be implemented without 
recognition. More important, the former reading is in conflict with this Court's own 
subsequent interpretations of Davies. In Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court restated the Davies standard slightly, inserting an additional comma that 
eliminated any ambiguity in the proper standard, stating: "Recovery under quasi-contract or 
contract implied in law is measured by the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant and 
not by the detriment incurred by plaintiff or, necessarily, the reasonable value of the plaintiffs 
13 
services." Id. at 975. State that manner, it is clear that "reasonable value of the plaintiffs 
services" is a restatement, nc .mitation, of the measure of damages.5 
This Court subsequently further clarified that the measure of damages for implied-in-law 
contract under Davies is reasonable value in Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356 
(Utah App. 1991). In Olson, a defendant filed a counterclaim seeking reimbursement for 
personal services and expenditures rendered to a company and for managing the company during 
its final year of operation. In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the counterclaim, this 
Court wrote: 
Each party relies on Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987), in 
which this court distinguished the variants of quantum meruit and diagrammed the 
elements of each. Park's counterclaim alleges a contract implied in law, also 
referred to as unjust enrichment or quasi-contract. In order to succeed on this 
claim, Park must show Olson received a benefit Park's efforts, Olson's 
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit, and that the circumstances make it 
unjust for Olson to retain the benefit without reimbursing Park for it. Id. at 269. 
If Park succeeded in establishing these elements, he could recover the reasonable 
value of his services inuring to Olson's benefit. 
Id. at 1360. 
The following year, this Court again analyzed the propriety of an unjust enrichment 
award in terms of the value of the services provided. In Shoreline Development. Inc. v. Utah 
County. 835 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah App. 1992), the plaintiff alleged causes of action under 
express contract, implied in fact contract, and general unjust enrichment. The lower court 
dismissed the claims for contract and implied in fact contract, and submitted the remaining 
unjust enrichment claim to the jury, which awarded the plaintiff $94,000.00. 
5
 It would be unusual, not to mention grammatically incorrect, to state the value is "not . . . 
necessarily, the reasonable value." 
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On appeal, the defendant complained of the amount of damages awarded pursuant to the 
unjust enrichment claim. This Court affirmed, stating: 
The County errs, however, in focusing on the "net benefit" of the entire 
transaction. The appropriate benefit upon which Shoreline's unjust enrichment 
claim is based, an upon which damages must be awarded, is the service rendered 
by Shoreline in obtaining the dredge. The fact that following the receipt of this 
benefit the County was unsuccessful in making a profitable use of the dredge is 
immaterial to the valuation of Shoreline's services. The County, not Shoreline, 
bore the risk the venture might fail. 
* * * 
. . . Nowhere in the County's attempt to marshal is there any indication that the 
services rendered in obtaining the dredge were not worth $94,000. 
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).6 
Application of this rule is consistent with the Court's recognition that the purpose of 
unjust enrichment is to "prevent the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense." Davies. 
supra. If a plaintiff has received the full value of services he provided, it cannot be said that 
a defendant has been enriched at the plaintiff's expense. 
In addition, the theory of damages adopted by the district court in this case is unworkable 
from a practical standpoint. The inappropriateness of measuring recovery by a defendant's 
"gain" (i.e., profit) is perhaps best illustrated by posing the question of what Groscost would 
have been awarded if the house had been sold at a break-even figure or at a loss. Under the 
district court's measure of damages, Groscost would not have been entitled to any recovery. 
6
 Without recognition of the contrary indications of Scheller. Olson. Shoreline, and prior Supreme 
Court precedent, this Court recently cited Davies for the proposition that the measure of damages for 
contract implied in law is not the reasonable value of services. Bailey-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 876 
P.2d 421, 425-46 (Utah App. 1994). Alder respectfully submits that, regardless of the Court's ultimate 
ruling in this appeal, reconciliation of the Court's differing expressions on the standard would be 
beneficial. 
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Application of a measure of damages determined by such unpredictable variables would 
be unfair from the perspectives of both parties. In the common example of a party performing 
work on a construction project, the party's entitlement to recovery would be subject to the 
whims of the marketplace. If housing values were to drop dramatically, contractors would get 
less than the reasonable value of their services, essentially allowing defendants to be enriched 
at the contractors' expense. Conversely, if market prices spiraled upward, contractors would 
get more than they or the defendants contemplated, and defendants would be deprived of their 
right to the profits of the sale. In addition to the unattractiveness of fortuity as the determining 
factor in a measure of damages, an incentive would nearly always be created for one party to 
seek to avoid prior arrangements to take advantage of the changed circumstances. 
Owners assume the risk in building a house. They should realize the profits of the sale, 
or absorb the losses. Conversely, contractors should receive the reasonable value of their 
services regardless of whether the project was ultimately profitable or not. Returning to the 
above hypothetical: If the house had sold at a loss, the district court might have been tempted 
to award the contractor the reasonable value of his services anyway. In other words, the district 
court's measure of damages would now constitute the greater of reasonable value or profits. 
There simply is no legal or practical basis for adoption of such a measure. 
Under both Supreme Court precedent and a common sense approach, the proper damages 
to be awarded under Utah law are the reasonable value of the services bestowed upon a 
defendant. This result is consistent with the general rule of recovery in quasi-contract cases 
recognized in the Restatement of Restitution. Section 155 of the Restatement, addressing "Quasi 
Contracts and Kindred Equitable Relief," states: 
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Where a person is entitled to restitution from another because the other, without 
tortious conduct, has received a benefit, the measure of recovery for the benefit 
thus received is the value of what was received. . . . 
Restatement of Restitution. § 155(1) (1937). 
The "value of what was received" is further clarified in comment d to the section: 
Services and improvements. Normally, it is only where a person has consented 
to receive services or improvements upon his things that there can be restitution, 
unless the services or improvements were received as a result of his fault. Where 
he consented to receive them promising to pay therefor, but the transaction was 
voidable, the fact that he asked for them shows that they are of value to him even 
though resulting in no pecuniary advantage, and normally he would be required 
to pay the market price of such services. 
Id.
 9 comment d. 
Awarding Groscost all of Alder's proceeds from the sale of the house not only deprived 
Alder of his rights under Utah law, but it unjustly enriches Groscost at Alder's expense, the very 
result the doctrine of unjust enrichment is intended to avoid.7 
II. APPLYING THE CORRECT MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES, GROSCOST FAILED TO ADDUCE 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON PORTIONS OF HIS 
DAMAGES CLAIM, 
Applying the correct measure of damages, Groscost was required to adduce sufficient 
evidence of the cost or reasonable value8 of material and labor provided in connection with the 
7
 Stripping a defendant of profits is generally reserved for cases of fraud or breach of confidential 
relationship in which imposition of a constructive trust is warranted. See, e.g., Mattes v. Olearin. 759 
P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1989), and cases cited therein. The measure of damages applied by the 
district court in this case would essentially call for courts to impose the equivalent of a constructive trust 
routinely in unjust enrichment cases. Again, there does not seem to be any legal or policy basis 
supporting such a result. 
8
 Under contract implied in fact, the requirement would be in terms of "cost," as that is the 
measure intended by the parties. Under contract impled in law, the evidentiary requirement is reasonable 
value. (See previous section.) In this case, the effect is the same, as Groscost did not offer any evidence 
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Alder home. At trial, Groscost submitted an itemized list of materials and labor claimed to have 
been provided to Alder, totalling $199,238.19. (R.259). Of that amount, Groscost testified that 
he had received payment of $149,931.20. (R.259-60). The additional amount sought was, 
accordingly, $49,306.99. (R.261). 
Individual items comprising Groscost's damages claim were referenced at trial by various 
numbered tabs in notebooks admitted as Trial Exhibits 4 and 5. (T. 84-85). The notebooks were 
labelled Groscost v. Alder, Construction Invoices, Books 1 and 2. Tabs 1-7 were contained in 
Trial Exhibit 4, and Tabs 8-46 were contained in Exhibit 5. For consistency and the 
convenience of the Court, the discussion below utilizes the same references to the Tab numbers. 
To warrant an award of damages, it was necessary for Groscost to adduce evidence that 
he provided material and labor to Alder costing or having a reasonable value in excess of the 
$149,931.20 he acknowledges receiving. This determination would require findings of fact by 
the district court, as portions of the services claimed by Groscost are disputed by Alder. (For 
example, the documentation for some charges added to the claim after suit was filed state on 
their face that they are for other projects. (R.223-25). While Groscost offered an explanation 
for this discrepancy, the legitimacy of Groscost's claim is disputed.) 
Although the truthfulness of Groscost's testimony is not conceded, Alder does not dispute 
for purposes of this appeal that Groscost proffered evidence on certain portions of the labor and 
material provided to Alder and of its cost or reasonable value. However, Groscost failed to 
adduce any required evidence on other aspects of his claim, discussed below. 
of reasonable value other than cost. 
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A. Introduction. 
As the plaintiff, Groscost bore the burden of offering evidence sufficient to prove the 
amount of his alleged damages. However, several items contained in Groscost's claim had 
completely inadequate evidentiary bases or no evidentiary support at all. 
The insufficiency of evidence of damages is a matter of law determinable by this Court. 
Meese. supra. This Court can and should hold that Groscost failed to adduce sufficient evidence 
to sustain the damages award sought, as specified below, and therefore Alder is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
B. No evidence of cost or reasonable value. 
1. Tab 1. 
Tab 1 sought $15,920.00 for services described as "Labor - walls, roof, framing, stairs 
& woodwork." (Trial Exhibit 4, p. 1). The only evidence offered in connection with this claim 
was the testimony of Groscost. (R.262-73). 
There was no testimony as to the cost or reasonable value of the services claimed under 
Tab 1. Groscost testified that he had the information available to him (R.433-35), but he did 
not make any determination of what a reasonable charge would be for the services. Groscost 
testified that he simply figured out the lowest amount charged for any of employees and the 
highest amount and just generally "constituted" a figure. He did not identify what that figure 
was, or how he selected it. Moreover, Groscost testified that the lowest charge for an employee 
was $11 per hour, and the highest $33 per hour - a range of 300 percent. 
Alder recognizes that a plaintiff is not required to prove damages with absolute certainty. 
Acculog. Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 732 (Utah 1984); Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 
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(Utah 1983). However, in this case Groscost admitted he had the information available to him 
and but did not look it up. Generally, relaxation of the degree of certainty of proof is permitted 
when damages "cannot be proved with precision." Bastian, supra (emphasis added). Courts 
have not applied the doctrine when a plaintiff simply chooses not to look up information already 
in his possession. 
A plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for damages without sufficient evidence demonstrating 
a rational basis for calculation. Bastian. supra; Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co.. 29 
Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972). There was no evidence, or completely inadequate evidence, 
of cost or reasonable value of the services claimed under Tab 1. As a matter of law, Groscost 
cannot recover for that portion of his claim. 
2. Tab 7. 
The same defect exists regarding a portion of the items of damage claimed under Tab 7. 
Groscost sought $28,846.68 for "Footings, Foundation, [and] Floors." (Trial Exhibit 4, Tab 
4.) Approximately $9,122.99 of the amount claimed in Tab 7 consists of invoices for material. 
(Id.) Although Alder disputes that the material was actually used for his home9, for purposes 
of this appeal it is agreed that the cost of the materials reflected in the invoices is evidence of 
their reasonable value. 
The remainder of the amount claimed under Tab 7 ($19,723.69), however, represents 
labor for which there was no evidence of cost or reasonable value. Again, Groscost admitted 
9
 The project numbers written on several of the invoices are for jobs other than the Alder's home. 
Groscost testified that he "buried" some of the Alder expense in other projects, which reduced the 
apparent profit on those projects (R.223-25). Alder argued below that the expenses were actually 
incurred on the other projects, and that Groscost added them to the claim late in the course of litigation 
in retaliation to Alder's refusal to pay Groscost's demand. 
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that he had the information available to him, but chose not to look it up. The only testimony 
offered to explain the amount sought was a statement that his "top foreman" was making 
$34/hour on overtime, that charges for some of his "lead people" included amounts for extra 
benefits, and he just "constituted a price" of $125-180/day. (R.281-82). There was no 
indication that any of the workers were his "top foreman" or any of his "lead people," or 
anything else justifying application of the highest possible rate. 
Groscost's testimony is analogous to making a claim for attorney fees without indicating 
what rates are being charged, or whether the work was performed by a senior partner or a new 
associate. In the absence of any evidence as to cost or reasonable value of the services 
performed, Groscost is barred from recovery for the $19,723.69 of the amount claimed under 
Tab 7. 
3, Tab 10. 
Under Tab 10, Groscost sought $7,845.01 for "Concrete for Driveway & Stairs." (Trial 
Exhibit 5, Cover Sheet). Of that amount, $2,214.51 represented invoices for materials. (Trial 
Exhibit 5, Tab 10). Again, Alder does not concede that the invoices, which are identified as 
applying to other job numbers, were actually used for his house. However, for purposes of this 
analysis, it is agreed that the invoices would represent evidence of reasonable value. 
The remaining portion of Tab 10 ($5,630.50) consists of labor. Again, there was no 
testimony as to cost or reasonable value of the services allegedly provided. The only testimony 
was a statement by Groscost that it was the "same type of scenario". (R.288). As a matter of 
law, the evidence cannot sustain an award on this portion of Groscost's damages. 
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In summary, the portions of Tabs 1, 7, and 10 for which there was insufficient evidence 
of cost or reasonable value total $41,274.19. 
C. No evidentiary support at all. 
For some items of damage claimed in Exhibits 4 and 5, Groscost offer no "backup" (to 
use the district court's term). An illustration of the absence of evidentiary support is found in 
the following dialogue between the district court and Groscost relating to the claim made under 
Tab 6: 
THE COURT: Where is the backup on the material, labor, trenching, backfill? 
THE WITNESS: There's none there. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE WITNESS: There's none there. 
THE COURT: There's no backup on that? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: How much is it attributable on that? 
THE WITNESS: About $2,500. 
MR. GOODSELL: Is there a reason why there is no backup? 
A. Well, just haven't put it together; just knowing, you know, who we had and 
whatever there. No, I don't have a backup. I can constitute that, if necessary. 
(R.278-79). 
Groscost also testified that he did not know what certain amounts represented, and that 
one item claimed was a duplicate which should be eliminated. Those items, and the particular 
evidentiary defects, are as follows: 
Tab 3 - No receipt or documentation. (R.273, 435-36). $400. 
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Tab 5 - No receipts or documentation for $1,050 of the $2,856.34 claimed. (R.275-77). 
Tab 6 - No backup at all for $2,881.48 of the $5,600 claimed. (R.277-79) 
Tab 12 - No explanation of the amount. (R.291-90, 439). $425. 
Tab 31 - Groscost testified that he thinks "there's an invoice somewhere" that indicates 
the material is for the Alder house, but he did not produce it at trial. (R.309-10). $1,520. 
Tabja - Duplicate. (R.310-11, 328). $673.84. 
Tab 40 - Groscost testified that he does not know what $59.96 of the claimed amount 
represents. (R.314-16). $59.96. 
The total amount of Groscost's claim for which there is not even arguable evidentiary 
support is thus $7,010.28. Together with the unsupported damages discussed above in Section 
B, the total amount of the claim unsupported by required evidence is still $48,284.47. 
Subtracting that amount from $199,238.19, the total amount claimed to have been owed by the 
Alders, Groscost offered evidence only in support of $150,953.72.10 Groscost acknowledges 
receiving $149,921.30 in payment, or $1,032.42 under the maximum amount sustainable under 
his evidence. As a matter of law, there is no legal basis for an award of damages against Robert 
Alder exceeding one-half of that difference. 
D. Additional inadequacies in evidence. 
Apart from the evidentiary gaps identified in the previous section, it is appropriate for 
this Court to determine as a matter of law that Groscost is unable to recover certain amounts of 
his damages on other grounds. 
10
 Alder submits that this figure is not coincidental. As Groscost testified, by the time the divorce 
came up, he knew "about how much" the house was ultimately going to cost. (R.238). It is Alder's 
belief that the amount Groscost requested at the June 1993 closing was the true amount owing. The 
additional $1,032.42 roughly reflects a few additional expenses that were incurred after the closing. 
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First, Groscost failed to produce at trial the sole record which he claimed would verify 
a substantial portion of his itemization. As mentioned previously, a number of the invoices and 
time cards which Groscost claimed to be attributable to the Alder house had other project 
numbers specified on them. (R.223-25, 267-68, 425-27). Groscost testified that the work was 
actually performed for the Alders. (Id.). However, Groscost stated that the only way to verify 
whether employees really worked on the Alder house (instead of what their own records say) 
would be by examining a document called "the red book," in which his employees' actual 
locations supposedly were recorded. (R.270-72). Groscost did not offer the red book as 
evidence at trial. 
Because of its belief as to the measure of damages, the district court was not required 
to decide Alder's contention that the items of damage determinable only by reference the red 
book could not be recovered. (R.630). The best evidence rule requires that "the contents of 
an available written document be proved by introduction of the document itself." Roods v. 
Roods. 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982); U.R.E. 1002. Where a party testifies that the only way 
to determine whether a particular item of alleged damage is attributable to the defendant is a 
document in that party's possession, the party's failure to offer the document renders 
inappropriate an award for those damages. 
In that regard, charges which could not be attributed to the Alder house totalled 
$25,152.64, broken down as follows: 
Tab 1 - 255/710.5 hours - (35.9% of $15,920.00 claimed = $5,715.28) 
Tab 7 - 406/856.5 hours - (47.4% of $28,846.68 claimed = $13,673.33) 
Tab 8 - 31/79.5 hours - (39.0% of $7,235.00 claimed = $2,821.65) 
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Tab 9 - 38/57 hours - (66.7% of $2,875.00 claimed = $1,917.63) 
Tab 10 - 57/314 hours - (18.2% of $7,845.01 claimed = $1,024.75) 
E. Summary of unsupported damages. 
As specified in subsection B above, Groscost failed to adduce evidence of cost or value 
of $48,284.47 of his claimed damages. 
As specified in subsection C above, Groscost failed to adduce the only evidence which 
could verify that $25,152.64 of the labor claimed was actually provided to Alder. In light of 
this fact, even if it were ultimately determined that the remainder of the damages sought were 
chargeable to Alder, the maximum award against Robert Alder sustainable under the evidence 
at trial would be $12,077.17. ($199,238.19 - $25,152.64 = $174,085.55, or $24,154.35 more 
than Groscost admitted receiving, reduced by one-half.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellant Robert Alder respectfully requests the Court 
to reverse the district court's award of damages in this case upon two grounds: First, that the 
measure of damages applied was erroneous; and second, that under the correct measure of 
damages, Groscost failed to adduce evidence to sustain an award of damages. 
DATED thiso£V day of July, 1995. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Kirra J. Porte 
Attorneys for Appellant Robert Alder 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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vs. : 
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ROBERT DEANE ALDER, an : 
individual and JANALYN ALDER, an : Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
individual, : 
Defendants. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 9th and 10th days of November, 
1994 and on the 13th day of December, 1994, plaintiff James Groscost having appeared 
and having been represented by his legal counsel, Daniel V. Goodsell of the law firm 
Kirton & McConkie, and defendant Robert Deane Alder having appeared and having 
been represented by his legal counsel Karra Porter and the law firm Christensen, Jensen 
& Powell, and the court having heard the testimony of plaintiff James C. Groscost, Kathy 
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Groscost, defendant Janalyn Alder and defendant Robert Deane Alder, and having 
received documentary evidence, and having considered the pleadings and other papers on 
file in this matter, and good cause appearing, hereby enters the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That there was no meeting of the minds between the parties to this action 
regarding the construction of the Alder's home at 6503 Canyon Cove Dr., Salt Lake City, 
Utah (the "House"). 
2. That there is therefore no contract between the parties regarding the 
construction of the House. 
3. That plaintiff nevertheless provided a substantial benefit to defendants 
Robert Alder and Janalyn Alder in the construction of the House by providing his 
expertise and experience as a general contractor together with benefits that could be 
derived through plaintiffs relationship with Broken Arrow Contracting in terms of 
acquiring materials and labor at a reduced cost. 
4. That plaintiff also provided a substantial benefit to defendants through his 
own labor in the construction of the House. 
5. That defendants acknowledged and recognized the benefit conferred upon 
them by plaintiffs labor, experience and expertise in the construction of the House. 
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6. That the House sold in August of 1993 for $295,000. 
7. That after deducting payments previously made to plaintiff for the cost of 
construction of the House and after subtracting costs of sale (including brokers fees and 
closing costs), defendants received net proceeds of $116,900 from the sale of the House in 
August of 1993. 
8. That the net proceeds of $116,900 from the sale of the House was later 
divided equally between defendants as part of their divorce, each of them receiving 
$58,450. 
9. That in addition to the $58,450, received by defendant Robert Alder from 
the sale of the House, he also received an additional $10,000 refund from plaintiff of 
construction costs previously paid. 
10. That of the $68,450 received by defendant Robert Alder ($58,450 plus 
$10,000), $23,500 is attributable to the payments defendant Robert Alder made towards 
the purchase of the lot upon which the House is built out of his own savings earned prior 
to marrying defendant Janalyn Alder. 
11. That of the $68,450 received by defendant Robert Alder, $17,535 is 
attributable to the contribution to the building of the itbse by defendant Robert Alder, 
and his wife, family and friends. 
-3-
0 0 0 1 A a 
12. That the contribution of defendant Robert Alder and his wife, family and 
friends towards the construction of the House is equal to $17,535, or 15% of the net 
proceeds from the sale of the House (.15 x $116,900 = $17,535). 
13. That it would be unjust to allow defendants to retain the benefit conferred 
by plaintiff without paying for it. 
14. That defendants, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, intended to pay for the 
House. 
15. That as of June 4, 1994, the House was substantially complete. 
16. That the mechanic's lien filed by plaintiff against the House on September 
10, 1993, was recorded for an improper purpose. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court hereby enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of the benefit 
conferred upon defendants. 
2. That after subtracting the above-referenced payments of $23,500 and 
$17,535 from the $68,450 received by defendant Robert Deane Alder from the sale of the 
House and refund of construction costs previously paid to plaintiff, the benefit conferred 
upon defendant Robert Alder by plaintiff was $27,415 ($68,450 - $23,500 - $17,535 = 
$27,415). 
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3. That defendant Robert Alder incurred attorneys fees in the amount of 
$3,954.92 in having plaintiffs improper mechanic's lien removed from the House. 
4. That the amount of $3,954.92 should be offset against the $27,415 of unjust 
enrichment damages to which plaintiff is entitled. 
5. That plaintiff is entitled to a net judgment of $23,460.08 ($27,415.00 -
$3,954.92 = $23,460.08). 
6. That the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount awarded 
herein from and after June 4, 1993 (the date of substantial completion of the House), in 
the amount of 10% per annum. 
7. That plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest in the amount awarded 
herein at the statutory rate of 5.61% per annum. 
8. That plaintiff should be awarded costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this 2> day of-Beemi&er, 199£ 
BY TOE^COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Karra J. Pc#U*r 
Attorney for Defendant Robert Deane Alder 
Honorable Kenneth 
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Richard R. Neslen (A2397) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES C. GROSCOST, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT DEANE ALDER, an 
individual and JANALYN ALDER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 9th and 10th days of November, 
1994 and on the 13th day of December, 1994, at 10:00 a.m., plaintiff James Groscost 
having appeared and having been represented by his legal counsel, Daniel V. Goodsell of 
the law firm Kirton & McConkie, and defendant Robert Deane Alder having appeared 
and having been represented by his legal counsel of record, Karra Porter and the law firm 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, and the court having heard the testimony of plaintiff James 
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C. Groscost, Kathy Groscost, defendant Janalyn Alder and defendant Robert Deane 
Alder, and having received documentary evidence, and having considered the pleadings 
and other papers on file in this matter, and good cause appearing, and the court having 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED that the plaintiff recover of defendant Robert Alder the sum of $23,460.08, 
together with prejudgment interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from June 4, 
1993 to the date of this Judgment, post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 5.61% 
per annum as provided by law and plaintiffs costs incurred in this action in the amount of 
•'A 
DATED this ^ day o f j i g s e s ^ r 199/ 
S^ 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
4AIMJD 
onorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
SOIVVA u Hyi 
Ibarra J. Porter 
Attorney for Defendant Robert Deane Alder 
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